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11Nr. 1  De Telegraaf e.a./Nederland
Europees Hof voor de Rechten van de Mens 22 november 2012
Application no. 39315/06
Op 25 maart en 11 juli 2008 wees de Hoge Raad twee arresten waarin het recht op 
journalistieke bronbescherming centraal stond. In beide zaken werd Uitgevers-
maatschappij De Telegraaf BV – later omgedoopt in Telegraaf Media Nederland 
Landelijke Media BV – geheel of grotendeels in het ongelijk gesteld.
Het arrest van 25 maart 2008 was de afsluiting van een beklagprocedure in de 
zin van artikel 552a en 552d van het Wetboek van Strafvordering. De journalis-
ten Joost de Haas en Bart Mos bezaten documenten van de Algemene Inlichtin-
gen- en Veiligheidsdienst (AIVD) en/of zijn voorganger de Binnenlandse Veilig-
heidsdienst. De stukken waren ontvangen van een bron aan wie de journalisten 
hadden toegezegd zijn of haar identiteit niet te zullen onthullen. In een artikel 
op de voorpagina van De Telegraaf van 21 januari 2006 gaven zij een weergave 
van de inhoud. Uit de stukken zou blijken dat de AIVD onderzoek deed naar de 
crimineel Mink K., omdat deze ervan verdacht werd ambtenaren om te kopen, 
grote voorraden wapens te bezitten en zaken te doen met terroristische organi-
saties. Gesteld werd dat deze geheime documenten circuleerden in het Amster-
damse criminele circuit. Vlak voor de publicatie gaf De Telegraaf kopieën van de 
documenten aan de AIVD.
Dat was voor de overheid niet genoeg. De AIVD deed aangifte van de straf-
bare feiten omschreven in de artikelen 98 en 98c Sr (schending en bezit van een 
staatsgeheim) en het Openbaar Ministerie vorderde op grond van artikel 96a Sv 
de afgifte van de originele documenten. De Telegraaf had daar bezwaar tegen, 
omdat forensisch onderzoek naar vingerafdrukken zou kunnen leiden tot iden-
tiﬁcatie van de bron. Een aanbod om de stukken in het bijzijn van de ofﬁcier van 
justitie te vernietigen werd echter door het OM afgewezen. Tenslotte werden de 
originele documenten onder protest afgegeven in een verzegelde enveloppe, die 
door het OM niet zou worden geopend voordat de rechtbank op het beklag tegen 
de inbeslagneming zou hebben beslist. De rechtbank te ’s-Gravenhage besliste 
op 31 maart 2006 dat het beklag ongegrond was en het cassatieberoep daartegen 
werd door de Hoge Raad verworpen.
Het arrest van de Hoge Raad van 11 juli 2008 heeft dezelfde feitelijke achter-
grond, maar werd gewezen in een kort geding tegen de Staat der Nederlanden. 
De procedure was aangespannen door De Telegraaf, de reeds genoemde Joost de 
Haas en Bart Mos, de Nederlandse Vereniging van Journalisten en het Neder-
lands Genootschap van Hoofdredacteuren. Uit het dossier van de strafrechtelijke 
procedure kon worden opgemaakt dat de AIVD een eigen onderzoek was gestart 
tegen de twee journalisten. Daarin kon de AIVD gebruik maken van de bijzonde-
re bevoegdheden bedoeld in de artikelen 20 en 25 van de Wet op de inlichtingen- 
en veiligheidsdiensten (observeren, registreren, volgen, aftappen en aﬂuisteren). 
Ook op die manier zou de overheid erin kunnen slagen het lek binnen de geheime 
dienst te achterhalen. De eisers achtten deze handelwijze onrechtmatig, mede 
gezien artikel 10 EVRM.
De voorzieningenrechter van de rechtbank te ’s-Gravenhage wees de vordering 
op 21 juni 2006 vrijwel volledig toe. Hiertegen ging de Staat met succes in hoger 
beroep. Het Hof te ’s-Gravenhage oordeelde op 31 augustus 2006 dat de han-
delwijze van de AIVD gerechtvaardigd was op grond van artikel 10, tweede lid, 
EVRM. Slechts op één onderdeel kwam het Hof De Telegraaf tegemoet. Vanaf 
het moment dat de AIVD een persoon in beeld kreeg die de geheime documenten 
zou hebben gelekt, had de dienst de inzet van bijzondere bevoegdheden jegens de 
journalisten moeten staken. Zowel De Telegraaf c.s. als de Staat stelden beroep 
in cassatie in, maar de Hoge Raad verwierp beide beroepen.
De klacht in Straatsburg wordt ingediend door De Telegraaf, Joost de Haas, Bart 
Mos, de Nederlandse Vereniging van Journalisten en het Nederlands Genoot-
schap van Hoofdredacteuren. Zij voeren aan dat Nederland de artikelen 10 en 
8 EVRM heeft geschonden. Op 18 mei 2010 beslist het Europese Hof dat de NVJ 
en het Nederlands Genootschap van Hoofdredacteuren niet ontvankelijk zijn, 
omdat deze verenigingen niet zelf zijn getroffen door de maatregelen. Een beslis-
sing over de ontvankelijkheid van de overige drie partijen wordt aangehouden 
tot de hoofdzaak. In onderstaand arrest blijken op dat punt geen problemen. Het 
Hof gaat eerst in op de bijzondere bevoegdheden van de AIVD (HR 11 juli 2008) en 
daarna op de inbeslagneming van originele documenten met mogelijke vingeraf-
drukken (HR 25 maart 2008).
In the case of Telegraaf Media Nederland Landelijke Media B.V. 
and Others v. the Netherlands
The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a 
Chamber composed of Josep Casadevall, President, Egbert Myjer, 
Corneliu Bîrsan, Alvina Gyulumyan, Ineta Ziemele, Luis López Guer-
ra, Kristina Pardalos, judges, and Marialena Tsirli, Deputy Section 
Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 19 June and 23 October 2012,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that last-
mentioned date:
PROCEDURE
(...)
THE FACTS
(...)
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLES 8 AND 10 OF THE CON-
VENTION
63.  Articles 8 and 10 provide as follows:
Article 8
“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, 
his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the 
exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law 
and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national 
security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for 
the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or 
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”
Article 10
“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right 
shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart 
information and ideas without interference by public authority 
and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent states 
from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema 
enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties 
and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, 
restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary 
in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, terri-
torial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or 
crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of 
the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of 
information received in conﬁdence, or for maintaining the autho-
rity and impartiality of the judiciary.”
A.  The use of “special powers” against the second and third 
applicants
 64. The applicants argued that the use of special powers against 
the second and third applicants had not been “in accordance with the 
law”, as required by Article 8 § 2 of the Convention, or “prescribed by 
law”, as required by Article 10 § 2 of the Convention.
 65. The Government denied that there had been a violation of 
either Article.
1.  Admissibility
 66. The Court considers that this complaint is not manifestly ill-
founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3(a) of the Convention. 
Nor is it inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be 
declared admissible.
2. Argument before the Court
  (a) Government
 67. The Government recognised that the second and third appli-
cants had been under investigation and that special powers had been 
used against them, including the power to intercept and record tel-
ecommunications. This had undoubtedly entailed interference with 
their right to respect for their private and family life, protected by 
Article 8; it could also be construed as an interference with their free-
dom to receive and impart information and ideas, protected by Article 
10.
 68. The statutory basis for the interference had been constituted 
by section 6(2)(a) of the 2002 Intelligence and Security Services Act, 
which – along with its drafting history – was at all times accessible to 
the public.
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11  69.  Referring to the Court’s case-law, in particular Weber and Saravia v. Germany (dec.), no. 54934/00, ECHR 2006-XI, the Government stated 
that the situations which might attract the use of the AIVD’s special 
powers were set out in section 6 of the 2002 Intelligence and Security 
Services Act. Moreover, the AIVD published annual reports in which 
it identiﬁed the areas on which it had focused in the past year and the 
areas on which it would focus in the year ahead. The duty to publish 
an annual report had been expressly included in the legislation pre-
cisely to enhance the transparency of the AIVD’s use of its powers. 
The nature of the “offences” which might give rise to the interference 
in question was thus as foreseeable as it could be. The Government 
asked the Court to bear in mind that the expression “offence”, in the 
context of cases such as the present, had a connotation different from 
its primary meaning derived from criminal law.
 70. Even so, situations were bound to occur which were not foresee-
able, but in which action by the AIVD was clearly necessary in view 
of its task and the interests which it served. The present case was one 
such.
 71. Safeguards were in place. As the Supervisory Board had estab-
lished, the use of special powers had not continued any longer than 
was permissible in the light of the applicable provisions. The process-
ing – examination, use and storage – of data was subject to the statu-
tory requirements set out in section 12 of the 2002 Intelligence and 
Security Services Act. Shortcomings identiﬁed by the Supervisory 
Board had been addressed and the data wrongly recorded had been 
removed and destroyed (see paragraph 43 above).
 72. Statutory requirements set out in section 38 of the 2002 Intel-
ligence and Security Services Act governed the transmission of infor-
mation to the Public Prosecution Service. As was reﬂected in the 
Minister’s letter of 6 December 2006 to the applicants’ counsel (see 
paragraph 43 above), these had been complied with.
 73. A monitoring and control system was in place, consisting of the 
following bodies:
a) the Upper and Lower Houses of Parliament, and insofar as the 
covert operations of the intelligence and security services are con-
cerned, the Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services of 
the Lower House;
b) the Court of Audit and – in the case of the secret budget items of 
the intelligence and security services – the president of the Court of 
Audit personally;
c) the National Ombudsman;
d) the administrative courts in the case of decisions subject to 
judicial review, such as requests for access to data;
e) the civil courts where an intelligence or security service has 
committed an unlawful act in respect of a person or organisation;
f) the criminal courts where an ofﬁcial was called to account as a 
defendant or was summoned as a witness;
g) the Supervisory Board.
These various supervisory and monitoring bodies did not exclude 
one another. However, the supervision and monitoring by each of the 
bodies was subject to limitations depending on the type of authority 
and the stage of the investigation. These limitations followed from 
the intrinsically secret nature of the activities of intelligence and 
security services.
 74. The use of special powers required the prior authorisation of 
the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations. The request for 
authorisation had to mention the particular status, if any, of the per-
son under investigation – for example, the status of journalist.
 75. The interference complained of had had a “legitimate aim” in 
that it served the interests of national security, which had been direct-
ly compromised by the leaking of secret classiﬁed information.
 76. As to “necessity in a democratic society”, the Government point-
ed out that protecting national security was one of the main functions 
of the State. If it was found that secret classiﬁed information had been 
leaked from the AIVD, its ability to operate reliably was at stake and 
hence national security as well. In this case, moreover, the nature and 
content of the leaked information had been such that an investigation 
into the leak had been necessary, taking into account the statutory 
duty of care in respect of the security of persons with whose help data 
were collected and the secrecy of the relevant data and sources. For 
example, the operational names of two sources had been published in 
De Telegraaf together with contextual information capable of enabling 
dangerous criminals to discover the true identity of the persons con-
cerned. There had therefore been a statutory duty to take action.
 77. An alternative to the use of special powers had not been avail-
able, given that those responsible for the leak had a vested interest in 
concealing the facts and circumstances.
 78. The AIVD’s purpose had not been to identify the applicants’ 
journalistic sources; source protection was therefore not in issue.
 79. Domestic law itself – to wit, sections 31 and 32 of the 2002 Intel-
ligence and Security Services Act – laid down the requirements of 
subsidiarity and proportionality, subject to monitoring by the Super-
visory Board and with the possibility of lodging a complaint with the 
National Ombudsman.
  (b) Applicants
 80. The applicants agreed with the Government that the use of 
special powers against the second and third applicants constituted 
an “interference” with their rights under Articles 8 and 10. They sug-
gested, however, that the Government’s admission that they had been 
“targets” within the meaning of section 6(2)(a) of the 2002 Intelligence 
and Security Services Act was inconsistent with the position taken by 
the domestic courts, in particular the Court of Appeal (see paragraph 
31 above).
 81. If the second and third applicants had not themselves been 
“targets” within the meaning of section 6(2)(a), then the use of spe-
cial powers against them had lacked a statutory basis. If, on the con-
trary view, the second and third applicants had been targets – a posi-
tion which the applicants described as “preposterous”, since it would 
imply that they constituted a menace to the continued existence of 
the democratic legal order –, then a statutory basis had to be admit-
ted.
 82. However, safeguards against abuse were insufﬁcient given 
that there was no prior judicial review of the use of special powers. 
Authorisation given by the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom 
Relations was not sufﬁcient, since the Minister was hardly independ-
ent and impartial.
 83. A necessity in a democratic society for the interference had not 
been shown. The AIVD documents received by the applicants related 
to the period 1997-2000; the newspaper articles concerned had all 
been published in 2006, approximately six years later. In the appli-
cants’ submission, there was no appearance of any danger to inform-
ants, whose identity the newspaper publications did not reveal; nor 
had the AIVD’s operating procedures been divulged. At all events, 
the information itself contained in the documents had all been in the 
hands of criminals for a long time already.
 3. The Court’s assessment
  (a) Interference
 84. The applicant and respondent parties agree that there has been 
an “interference” with the rights of the second and third applicants 
under Articles 8 and 10 of the Convention, but disagree on its precise 
nature.
 85. The Government dispute the applicants’ position that the pro-
tection of journalistic sources is in issue. They argue that the AIVD 
resorted to the use of special powers not to establish the identity of 
the applicants’ journalistic sources of information, but solely to iden-
tify the AIVD staff member who had leaked the documents.
 86. The Court is prepared to accept that the AIVD’s purpose in seek-
ing to identify the person or persons who had supplied the secret doc-
uments to the applicants was subordinate to its main aim, which was 
to discover and then close the leak of secret information from within 
its own ranks. However, that is not decisive (see Sanoma Uitgevers B.V. 
v. the Netherlands [GC], no. 38224/03, § 66, 14 September 2010). The 
Court’s understanding of the concept of journalistic “source” is “any 
person who provides information to a journalist”; it understands 
“information identifying a source” to include, as far as they are likely 
to lead to the identiﬁcation of a source, both “the factual circum-
stances of acquiring information from a source by a journalist” and 
“the unpublished content of the information provided by a source to 
a journalist” (see Recommendation No. R(2000) 7 on the right of jour-
nalists not to disclose their sources of information (quoted in para-
graph 61 above); compare also Sanoma, §§ 65-66, and Weber and Saravia, 
§§ 144-45).
 87. As in Roemen and Schmit v. Luxembourg, no. 51772/99, § 52, ECHR 
2003-IV; Ernst and Others v. Belgium, no. 33400/96, § 100, 15 July 2003; 
Tillack v. Belgium, no. 20477/05, § 64, 27 November 2007; and Sanoma, 
loc. cit., the Court must therefore ﬁnd that the AIVD sought, by the use 
of its special powers, to circumvent the protection of a journalistic 
source (compare and contrast Weber and Saravia, cited above, § 151).
 88. Although questions raised by surveillance measures are usually 
considered under Article 8 alone, in the present case they are so inter-
twined with the Article 10 issue that the Court ﬁnds it appropriate to 
consider the matter under Articles 8 and 10 concurrently.
  (b) “In accordance with the law/prescribed by law”
 
 89. The Court must now decide whether the interference was “in 
accordance with the law” (Article 8) or “prescribed by law” (Article 
1
Mediaforum 2013-1 27
Ju
ri
sp
ru
de
nt
ie
 n
r. 
1110) – expressions which, although they differ in the English text of the Convention (both correspond to prévue(s) par la loi in the French 
version), are identical in meaning (see The Sunday Times v. the United 
Kingdom (no. 1), 26 April 1979, § 48, Series A no. 30, and Silver and Others 
v. the United Kingdom, 25 March 1983, § 85, Series A no. 61).
 90. The Court reiterates its case-law according to which the expres-
sion “in accordance with the law” not only requires the impugned 
measure to have some basis in domestic law, but also refers to the 
quality of the law in question, requiring that it should be accessible 
to the person concerned and foreseeable as to its effects. The law must 
be compatible with the rule of law, which means that it must provide 
a measure of legal protection against arbitrary interference by public 
authorities with the rights safeguarded by Article 8 § 1 and Article 10 
§ 1. Especially where, as here, a power of the executive is exercised in 
secret, the risks of arbitrariness are evident. Since the implementation 
in practice of measures of secret surveillance is not open to scrutiny by 
the individuals concerned or the public at large, it would be contrary 
to the rule of law for the legal discretion granted to the executive to 
be expressed in terms of an unfettered power. Consequently, the law 
must indicate the scope of any such discretion conferred on the com-
petent authorities and the manner of its exercise with sufﬁcient clar-
ity, having regard to the legitimate aim of the measure in question, to 
give the individual adequate protection against arbitrary interference 
(see Weber and Saravia, cited above, §§ 93-95 and 145; Segerstedt-Wiberg 
and Others v. Sweden, no. 62332/00, § 76, ECHR 2006-VII; Liberty and Oth-
ers v. the United Kingdom, no. 58243/00, §§ 62-63; 1 July 2008; Kennedy 
v. the United Kingdom, no. 26839/05, § 152, 18 May 2010).
 91. There is no suggestion that the law was not accessible.
 92. The letters which the Minister of the Interior and Kingdom 
Relations sent on 6 December 2006 to the Lower House of Parlia-
ment (paragraph 41 above) and to the applicants’ counsel (paragraph 
43) show that the use of special powers against the second and third 
applicants was considered lawful for the purposes of section 6(2)(a) of 
the 2002 Intelligence and Security Services Act. The Supreme Court’s 
judgment (§ 3.5.3, see paragraph 33 above) is based on the same view, 
at least for an initial period. The Court therefore ﬁnds that the statu-
tory basis for the interference in question was section 6(2)(a) of the 
2002 Intelligence and Security Services Act.
 93. The possibility that the applicants might be placed under sur-
veillance was not predictable in the sense that their situation cor-
responded to a precise statutory prescription. Nevertheless, even 
though the second and third applicants may resent the suggestion 
that their actions constituted a threat to the Netherlands democratic 
legal order, they could not reasonably be unaware that the informa-
tion which had fallen into their hands was authentic classiﬁed infor-
mation that had unlawfully been removed from the keeping of the 
AIVD and that publishing it was likely to provoke action aimed at dis-
covering its provenance. On its own reading of section 6(2)(a) and (c) of 
the 2002 Intelligence and Security Services Act, the Court is prepared 
to accept that the interference complained of was, in that sense, fore-
seeable.
 94.  As to the available safeguards, the applicants do not allege 
that the array of supervisory and monitoring procedures described by 
the Government (see paragraph 73 above) is in itself insufﬁcient.
 95.  Rather, it is the applicants’ contention that their status as 
journalists required special safeguards to ensure adequate protection 
of their journalistic sources. The Court will now turn to this issue.
 96.  In Weber and Saravia, the interference with the applicants’ 
rights under Articles 8 and 10 consisted of the interception of tel-
ecommunications in order to identify and avert dangers in advance, 
or “strategic monitoring” as it is also called. The ﬁrst applicant in that 
case being a journalist, the Court found that her right to protect her 
journalistic sources was in issue (loc. cit., §§ 144-45). However, the aim 
of strategic monitoring was not to identify journalists’ sources. Gener-
ally the authorities would know only when examining the intercept-
ed telecommunications, if at all, that a journalist’s conversation had 
been monitored. Surveillance measures were, in particular, not direct-
ed at uncovering journalistic sources. The interference with freedom 
of expression by means of strategic monitoring could not, therefore, 
be characterised as particularly serious (loc. cit., § 151). Although admit-
tedly there was no special provision for the protection of freedom of 
the press and, in particular, the non-disclosure of sources once the 
authorities had become aware that they had intercepted a journalist’s 
conversation, the safeguards in place, which had been found to satisfy 
the requirements of Article 8, were considered adequate and effective 
for keeping the disclosure of journalistic sources to an unavoidable 
minimum (loc. cit., § 151).
 97.  The present case is characterised precisely by the targeted sur-
veillance of journalists in order to determine from whence they have 
obtained their information. It is therefore not possible to apply the 
same reasoning as in Weber and Saravia.
 98.  The Court has indicated, when reviewing legislation govern-
ing secret surveillance in the light of Article 8, that in a ﬁeld where 
abuse is potentially so easy in individual cases and could have such 
harmful consequences for democratic society as a whole, it is in prin-
ciple desirable to entrust supervisory control to a judge (see Klass and 
Others v. Germany, 6 September 1978, § 56, Series A no. 28, and Kennedy, 
cited above, § 167). However, in both cases the Court was prepared to 
accept as adequate the independent supervision available. In Klass and 
Others, this included a practice of seeking prior consent to surveil-
lance measures of the G 10 Commission, an independent body chaired 
by a president who was qualiﬁed to hold judicial ofﬁce and which 
moreover had the power to order the immediate termination of the 
measures in question (mutatis mutandis, Klass and Others, §§ 21 and 51; 
see also Weber and Saravia, §§ 25 and 117). In Kennedy (loc. cit.) the Court 
was impressed by the interplay between the Investigatory Powers Tri-
bunal (“IPT”), an independent body composed of persons who held 
or had held high judicial ofﬁce and experienced lawyers which had 
the power, among other things, to quash interception orders, and the 
Interception of Communications Commissioner, likewise a function-
ary who held or had held high judicial ofﬁce (Kennedy, § 57) and who 
had access to all interception warrants and applications for intercep-
tion warrants (Kennedy, § 56).
 99.  In contrast, in Sanoma, an order involving the disclosure of 
journalistic sources was given by a public prosecutor. The Court dis-
missed as inadequate in terms of Article 10 the involvement of an 
investigating judge, since his intervention, conceded voluntarily by 
the public prosecutor, lacked a basis in law and his advice was not 
binding. Judicial review post factum could not cure these failings, since 
it could not prevent the disclosure of the identity of the journalistic 
sources from the moment when this information came into the hands 
of the public prosecutor and the police (loc. cit., §§ 96-99).
 100. In the instant case, as the Agent of the Government admitted 
at the hearing in reply to a question from the Court, the use of spe-
cial powers would appear to have been authorised by the Minister of 
the Interior and Kingdom Relations, if not by the head of the AIVD or 
even a subordinate AIVD ofﬁcial, but in any case without prior review 
by an independent body with the power to prevent or terminate it 
(section 19 of the 2002 Intelligence and Security Services Act, see para-
graph 51 above).
 101. Moreover, review post factum, whether by the Supervisory 
Board, the Committee on the Intelligence and Security Services of 
the Lower House of Parliament or the National Ombudsman, cannot 
restore the conﬁdentiality of journalistic sources once it is destroyed.
 102. The Court thus ﬁnds that the law did not provide safeguards 
appropriate to the use of powers of surveillance against journalists 
with a view to discovering their journalistic sources. There has there-
fore been a violation of Articles 8 and 10 of the Convention.
 B. The order to surrender the documents
 103. The applicants argued that the order to surrender the origi-
nal documents, ostensibly for the purpose of restoring the documents 
to the AIVD, had in fact been intended to make possible the positive 
identiﬁcation of the journalistic source. The applicants alleged a vio-
lation of their freedom, as purveyors of news, to impart information 
as guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention.
 104. The Government denied that there had been any such viola-
tion.
 1.  Admissibility
 105. The Court considers that this complaint is not manifestly 
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3(a) of the Conven-
tion. Nor is it inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be 
declared admissible.
 2. Argument before the Court
  (a) Government
 106. Under the head of “duties and responsibilities”, the Govern-
ment raised two points.
 107. Firstly, the Government considered the present case different in 
essential respects from Voskuil v. the Netherlands, no. 64752/01, 22 Novem-
ber 2007. The primary purpose of the surrender order had not been to 
identify the applicants’ journalistic sources, nor even the leak from 
within the AIVD – who was identiﬁable simply by studying the content 
of the information unlawfully leaked – but to withdraw the documents 
from public circulation. It was moreover found that the applicants had 
not returned all of the documents immediately; had they done so at the 
outset, there would have been no need for the surrender order.
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11  108. Secondly, the Government submitted that although the fact itself that secret classiﬁed documents had fallen into the hands 
of the criminal classes was a matter of public interest and therefore 
newsworthy, the applicants had gone beyond what was necessary in 
publishing information which they contained. Details published had 
included the code names of two informants and contextual informa-
tion capable of identifying them, which had compromised both their 
safety (and that of their families and others in their immediate circle 
of acquaintance) and national security.
 109. The surrender order undoubtedly constituted an “interfer-
ence”.
 110. The interference had been “prescribed by law”. The crucial dif-
ference between the present case and Sanoma was that the lawfulness 
of the surrender order was assessed by a court by virtue of its statutory 
power before the documents were handed over for inspection.
 111.  The “legitimate aims” pursued by the interference had been 
“national security” and “the prevention of crime”.
 112. Finally, the interference had been “necessary in a democrat-
ic society” for the furtherance of these aims. As stated above, it was 
necessary to ensure that all the documents should be returned to 
the AIVD. It was also important to investigate whether it was pos-
sible to determine if there had been access to the documents and if 
so, by whom (other than the second and third applicants and H., by 
then already a suspect). Again as already mentioned, the safety of two 
informants and members of their families and their immediate circle 
was in jeopardy as well.
 113. A surrender order had been the least intrusive measure availa-
ble, and therefore to be preferred to a search of the applicants’ premis-
es such as those carried out by the authorities in the cases of Roemen 
and Schmit and Ernst and Others, cited above.
 114. Finally, and again as already noted, there had been an inde-
pendent review by a court before the documents were passed on to the 
National Police Investigations Department.
  (b) Applicants
 115. The applicants complained that although ostensibly the pri-
mary purpose of the surrender order had been to withdraw the docu-
ments from public circulation, in fact the intention had been to sub-
ject them to technical examination and identify the applicants’ source. 
They pointed to the public prosecutor’s admission (see paragraph 22 
above) and that of the Government that the identity of the AIVD ofﬁ-
cial who leaked the documents had already been known simply from 
studying the content of the documents and identifying the AIVD ofﬁ-
cials who had had access to them, and also to the judgment convicting 
H. of the leaks (see paragraph 37 above), which reﬂected the fact that 
the documents had actually been examined.
 116. The documents obtained by the second and third applicants 
contained relatively old information, which moreover had already 
become known in criminal circles. The Government’s interest in keep-
ing the information secret had therefore not been prejudiced by the 
publications in De Telegraaf, but by the leak from within the AIVD; it 
followed that the action taken against the applicants could have had 
no other purpose than to trace the path followed by the documents 
back to the leak.
 117. Referring to the above-mentioned Sanoma judgment, they 
argued that orders to disclose sources might have a detrimental 
impact, not only on the source, but also on the newspaper itself, which 
would no longer be trusted by potential sources, and on the public, 
who had an interest in receiving information imparted through anon-
ymous sources. In addition, they argued, referring to the same judg-
ment, that there was no procedure attended by adequate legal safe-
guards for them to enable an independent assessment as to whether 
the interest of the criminal investigation overode the public interest 
in the protection of journalistic sources.
 3. The Court’s assessment
  (a) Interference
 118.  All agree that there has been an “interference” with the 
ﬁrst applicant’s freedom to receive and impart information. The 
Court so ﬁnds (see Sanoma, cited above, § 72).
  (b) Prescribed by law
 119.  It is not in dispute that the surrender order had a statutory 
basis, namely Article 96a of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see para-
graph 50 above). The Court so ﬁnds (see Sanoma, cited above, § 86).
 120.  As regards the procedural safeguards available, the Court 
ﬁnds that the present case differs in essential respects from Sanoma. 
The documents were placed in a container by a notary and sealed, 
after which the container with the documents was handed over to the 
investigating judge to be kept in a safe unopened pending the out-
come of objection proceedings in the Regional Court (see paragraph 
20 above). The applicants agreed to this procedure with the public 
prosecutor. Moreover, as the Government correctly point out, it had 
a statutory basis, namely Article 552a of the Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure, which moreover empowers the Regional Court to give any 
orders needed (see paragraph 50 above; compare and contrast Sanoma, 
§§ 96-97).
 121. The interference complained of was therefore “prescribed by 
law”.
  (c) Legitimate aim
 122. It is not in dispute that the aims pursued by the interference 
were, at the very least, “national security” and “the prevention of 
crime” as the Government state. The Court so ﬁnds.
  (d) Necessary in a democratic society
 123. The test of “necessity in a democratic society” requires the 
Court to determine whether the “interference” complained of cor-
responded to a “pressing social need”, whether it was proportion-
ate to the legitimate aim pursued and whether the reasons given by 
the national authorities to justify it are relevant and sufﬁcient (see, 
among many other authorities, The Sunday Times, cited above, § 62). 
In assessing whether such a “need” exists and what measures should 
be adopted to deal with it, the national authorities are left a certain 
margin of appreciation. This power of appreciation is not, however, 
unlimited but goes hand in hand with European supervision by the 
Court, whose task it is to give a ﬁnal ruling on whether a restriction 
is reconcilable with freedom of expression as protected by Article 10 
(see, among many other authorities, Cumpǎnǎ and Mazǎre v. Romania 
[GC], no. 33348/96, § 88, ECHR 2004-XI; Voskuil, cited above, § 63; 
and TV Vest AS and Rogaland Pensjonistparti v. Norway, no. 21132/05, § 58, 
ECHR 2008 (extracts)).
 124. The Court’s task, in exercising its supervisory jurisdiction, 
is not to take the place of the competent national authorities but 
rather to review under Article 10 the decisions they delivered pur-
suant to their power of appreciation. This does not mean that the 
supervision is limited to ascertaining whether the respondent State 
exercised its discretion reasonably, carefully and in good faith; what 
the Court has to do is to look at the interference complained of in 
the light of the case as a whole and determine whether the reasons 
adduced by the national authorities to justify it are “relevant and 
sufﬁcient” and whether it was “proportionate to the legitimate aim 
pursued”. In doing so, the Court has to satisfy itself that the nation-
al authorities applied standards which were in conformity with the 
principles embodied in Article 10 and, moreover, that they relied on 
an acceptable assessment of the relevant facts (see, among many other 
authorities, Hertel v. Switzerland, 25 August 1998, § 46, Reports 1998-VI; 
Cumpǎnǎ and Mazǎre, cited above, § 90; Pedersen and Baadsgaard v. Den-
mark [GC], no. 49017/99, §§ 68-71, ECHR 2004-XI; Steel and Morris v. the 
United Kingdom, no. 68416/01, § 87, ECHR 2005-II; Mamère v. France, no. 
12697/03, § 19, ECHR 2006-XIII; Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v. 
France [GC], nos. 21279/02 and 36448/02, § 45, ECHR 2007-IV; Voskuil, 
cited above, § 63; and Guja v. Moldova [GC], no. 14277/04, § 69, ECHR 
2008).
 125. Since 1985 the Court has frequently made mention of the task 
of the press as purveyor of information and “public watchdog” (see, 
among many other authorities, Barthold v. Germany, 25 March 1985, 
§ 58, Series A no. 90; Lingens v. Austria, 8 July 1986, § 44, Series A no. 
103; Thorgeir Thorgeirson v. Iceland, 25 June 1992, § 63, Series A no. 239; 
Cumpǎnǎ and Mazǎre, cited above, § 93; Voskuil, cited above, § 64; and 
Financial Times Ltd. and Others v. the United Kingdom, no. 821/03, § 59, 
15 December 2009).
 126. Under the terms of Article 10 § 2, the exercise of freedom of 
expression carries with it duties and responsibilities which also apply 
to the press. Article 10 protects a journalist’s right – and duty – to 
impart information on matters of public interest provided that he is 
acting in good faith in order to provide accurate and reliable infor-
mation in accordance with the ethics of journalism (Fressoz and Roire v. 
France [GC], no. 29183/95, § 54, ECHR 1999-I; Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas 
v. Norway [GC], no. 21980/93, § 65, ECHR 1999-III; and Financial Times 
Ltd. and Others, cited above, § 62).
 127. Protection of journalistic sources is one of the basic condi-
tions for press freedom, as is recognised and reﬂected in various inter-
national instruments including the Committee of Ministers Recom-
mendation quoted in paragraph 61 above. Without such protection, 
sources may be deterred from assisting the press in informing the 
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11public on matters of public interest. As a result the vital public-watch-dog role of the press may be undermined and the ability of the press 
to provide accurate and reliable information may be adversely affect-
ed. Having regard to the importance of the protection of journalistic 
sources for press freedom in a democratic society and the potentially 
chilling effect an order of source disclosure has on the exercise of that 
freedom, such a measure cannot be compatible with Article 10 of the 
Convention unless it is justiﬁed by an overriding requirement in the 
public interest (see Goodwin, cited above, § 39; Voskuil, cited above, 
§ 65; Financial Times Ltd. and Others, cited above, § 59; and Sanoma, cited 
above, § 51).
 128. While it may be true that the public perception of the princi-
ple of non-disclosure of sources would suffer no real damage where 
it was overridden in circumstances where a source was clearly acting 
in bad faith with a harmful purpose (for example, by intentionally 
fabricating false information), courts should be slow to assume, in the 
absence of compelling evidence, that these factors are present in any 
particular case. In any event, given the multiple interests in play, the 
Court emphasises that the conduct of the source can never be decisive 
in determining whether a disclosure order ought to be made but will 
merely operate as one, albeit important, factor to be taken into con-
sideration in carrying out the balancing exercise required under Arti-
cle 10 § 2 (Financial Times Ltd. and Others, cited above, § 63).
 129. Turning to the facts of the case, the Court notes that before 
the Regional Court the public prosecutor stated that the primary pur-
pose of the surrender order was to return them to the AIVD, although 
if the opportunity arose to examine them for usable traces it would 
be taken. However, as the public prosecutor admitted, even without 
detailed technical examination of the documents the culprits could 
be found simply by studying the contents of the documents and iden-
tifying the ofﬁcials who had had access to them (see paragraph 22 
above). That being so, the need to identify the AIVD ofﬁcial concerned 
cannot alone justify the surrender order.
 130. Although the full contents of the documents had not come to 
the knowledge of the general public, it is highly likely that that infor-
mation had long been circulating outside the AIVD and had come to 
the knowledge of persons described by the parties as criminals. With-
drawing the documents from circulation could therefore no longer 
prevent the information which they contained – including the code 
names and other information identifying AIVD informants – from 
falling into the wrong hands (see The Sunday Times v. the United 
Kingdom (no. 2), 26 November 1991, § 54, Series A no. 217; Observer and 
Guardian v. the United Kingdom, 26 November 1991, § 68, Series A no. 
216; and Vereniging Weekblad Bluf! v. the Netherlands, 9 February 1995, 
§ 45, Series A no. 306-A).
 131. There remains the need for the AIVD to check whether all the 
documents removed from its keeping had been withdrawn from cir-
culation. The Court accepts that this is a legitimate concern. However, 
that is not sufﬁcient to ﬁnd that it constituted “an overriding require-
ment in the public interest” justifying the disclosure of the applicant’s 
journalistic source. The Court takes the view that the actual handover 
of the documents taken was not necessary: since – as appears from the 
Minister’s letter of 20 December 2006 to the Lower House (see para-
graph 18 above) – these were copies not originals, visual inspection to 
verify that they were complete, followed by their destruction (as was 
in fact proposed by the ﬁrst applicant, see paragraph 22 above), would 
have sufﬁced.
 132. In sum, “relevant and sufﬁcient” reasons for the interference 
complained of have not been given. There has therefore been a viola-
tion of Article 10 of the Convention.
II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
 (...)
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT
1. Declares unanimously the remainder of the application admissible;
2. Holds unanimously that there has been a violation of Articles 8 and 
10 of the Convention as regards the use by the AIVD of special powers 
against the second and third applicants;
3. Holds by ﬁve votes to two that there has been a violation of Article 
10 of the Convention as regards the order for the surrender of docu-
ments addressed to the ﬁrst applicant;
4. Holds unanimously
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicants, within three 
months from the date on which the judgment becomes ﬁnal in 
accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 60,000 
(sixty thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the 
applicants, in respect of costs and expenses;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until 
settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at 
a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central 
Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
5. Dismisses unanimously the remainder of the applicants’ claim for 
just satisfaction.
 Done in English, and delivered at a public hearing in the Human 
Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 22 November 2012.
Marialena Tsirli  Josep Casadevall
Deputy Registrar  President
 In accordance with Article 45 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 74 § 2 
of the Rules of Court, the separate opinion of Judges Myjer and López 
Guerra is annexed to this judgment.
Noot
Wouter Hins
Drie maal is scheepsrecht. Voor de derde keer is Nederland door het 
Hof in Straatsburg veroordeeld wegens schending van het recht op 
bronbescherming, dat besloten ligt in artikel 10 EVRM. De eerste 
keer gebeurde dat in het Voskuil-arrest (EHRM 22 november 2007, 
Mediaforum 2008-2, nr. 6 m.nt. W.F. Korthals Altes). De tweede keer 
in het Sanoma-arrest (EHRM GK 14 september 2010, Mediaforum 2010-
11/12, nr. 29 met begeleidend artikel van G.A.I. Schuijt). Bovenstaand 
arrest maakt het drietal vol. De klacht van De Telegraaf e.a. richtte 
zich tegen twee arresten van de Hoge Raad, die ook in Mediaforum 
zijn geannoteerd (HR 25 maart 2008, Mediaforum 2008-5, nr. 18 m.nt. 
G.A.I. Schuijt en HR 11 juli 2008, Mediaforum 2008-11/12, nr. 36 m.nt. F. 
Fernhout). Het eerstgenoemde arrest had betrekking op de inbeslag-
neming door het OM van documenten met mogelijke vingerafdruk-
ken van een vertrouwelijke bron. Het tweede arrest betrof het gebruik 
van bijzondere bevoegdheden door de AIVD jegens journalisten.
Soms hebben annotaties in Mediaforum een voorspellende waarde. 
Schuijt was zeer kritisch in zijn noot bij HR 25 maart 2008 inzake de 
inbeslagneming. ‘Niet te begrijpen’ noemde hij de redenering van de 
Hoge Raad. Ook Fernhout was ontevreden. De Hoge Raad had in zijn 
arrest van 11 juli 2008 het belangrijkste cassatiemiddel van De Tele-
graaf c.s. opgevat als zou dit een absoluut recht op bronbescherming 
bepleiten. Vervolgens werd het cassatiemiddel afgewezen, omdat 
artikel 10, tweede lid, EVRM wel uitzonderingen mogelijk maakt. Die 
uitleg van de Hoge Raad was naar de mening van Fernhout ‘erg ﬂauw’. 
Het Hof is evenmin gecharmeerd van de wijze waarop Nederland is 
omgegaan met het recht op bronbescherming. Over de maatregelen 
van de AIVD oordeelt het Hof unaniem dat deze een schending ople-
verden van de artikelen 8 en 10 EVRM. Over de inbeslagneming van de 
documenten door het OM oordeelt het Hof met een meerderheid van 
5 tegen 2 dat artikel 10 EVRM is geschonden. 
Belangrijk in bovenstaand arrest is de toepassing van het criterium 
‘prescribed by law’ (artikel 10, tweede lid, EVRM), respectievelijk ‘in 
accordance with the law’ (artikel 8, tweede lid, EVRM). Op dit criterium 
sneuvelen de maatregelen van de AIVD. Net als in het Sanoma-arrest 
overweegt het Hof dat het nationale recht waarborgen moet bieden 
tegen ‘arbitrary interference by public authorities with the rights safeguarded 
by Article 8 § 1 and Article 10 § 1’ (r.o. 90). Het Hof legt de lat hoog, nu de 
AIVD het oogmerk had de vertrouwelijke bron van journalisten op te 
sporen. Vereist is een toetsing vooraf door een onafhankelijke auto-
riteit, die onderzoekt of het belang van de staatsveiligheid zwaarder 
weegt dan het belang van journalistieke bronbescherming. Artikel 
19 van de Wet op de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten (Wiv) voor-
ziet in controle vooraf door of namens de minister van Binnenlandse 
Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, maar deze autoriteit is niet ‘onafhan-
kelijk’. Het gebrek kan niet worden gerepareerd door de Commissie 
van toezicht betreffende de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten, een 
vaste commissie van de Tweede Kamer of de Nationale ombudsman, 
omdat deze alleen achteraf toezicht houden. Dat is te laat, want een 
reeds onthulde bron kan nooit meer geheim worden (r.o. 100 en 101).
Anders dan Sanoma?
Sedert het Sanoma-arrest van de Grote Kamer van het EHRM van 14 
september 2010 is bovenstaande redenering bekend. Dat is waar-
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11 schijnlijk de reden waarom het Bureau van het Hof heeft besloten het nieuwe arrest slechts te kwaliﬁceren als van ‘medium importance’ (level 
2). Volgens de website van het EHRM vallen onder level 2 ‘judgments, 
decisions and advisory opinions which, while not making a signiﬁcant contribu-
tion to the case-law, nevertheless go beyond merely applying existing case-law’. 
Zij staan in de hiërarchie achter Case reports en uitspraken van high 
importance (level 1), maar boven uitspraken van low importance (level 
3). Het Bureau, dat de kwaliﬁcaties vaststelt, wordt gevormd door de 
president en de vice-presidenten, alsmede de sectievoorzitters van het 
Hof. 
Wat voegt dit arrest toe aan Sanoma? Een mogelijk antwoord is te 
vinden in de overwegingen met betrekking tot de inbeslagneming. 
Overeenkomstig een beleidslijn van het College van procureurs-gene-
raal, neergelegd in een circulaire van 3 juni 2002 en gepubliceerd in 
Mediaforum 2009-5, p. 207, had het OM de journalisten in de gelegen-
heid gesteld de documenten verzegeld over te dragen en zich tegelijk 
te beklagen bij de rechtbank. Zou de rechtbank oordelen dat de inbe-
slagname onrechtmatig was, dan zou het OM de stukken niet zien. 
Sedert 2012 is deze praktijk opgenomen in de herziene Aanwijzing 
Toepassing dwangmiddelen bij journalisten (Stcrt. 2012, nr. 3656), 
besproken door O. Volgenant in Mediaforum 2012-4, p. 117. De proce-
dure van verzegeling is een elegante oplossing, maar men zou kun-
nen stellen dat een beleidsregel onvoldoende is. Een beleidsregel van 
het OM is immers geen wet, terwijl de Grote Kamer van het EHRM in 
r.o. 96-98 van het Sanoma-arrest een wettelijke grondslag eist. Ener-
zijds moet het OM wettelijk verplicht zijn een rechter in te schakelen. 
Anderzijds moet de rechter de wettelijke bevoegdheid hebben ken-
nisneming door het OM te verhinderen.
De Kamer blijkt nu minder streng. Hoewel het handelen van het OM 
slechts genormeerd was door een circulaire, oordeelt het EHRM dat 
de casus in belangrijke opzichten verschilt van Sanoma. Volgens r.o. 
120 waren er voldoende procedurele waarborgen, omdat de docu-
menten in verzegelde vorm waren afgestaan en uitsluitend beoor-
deeld zouden worden door de rechtbank. De beperking van artikel 10 
EVRM was daarmee ‘prescribed by law’. Dat De Telegraaf c.s. toch aan 
het langste eind trok komt doordat het Hof in meerderheid van oor-
deel is dat de inbeslagneming niet noodzakelijk was in een democra-
tische samenleving, een criterium dat in het Sanoma-arrest niet meer 
aan de orde kwam. Opvallend is dat de Nederlandse rechter Myjer 
zich bevond onder de twee dissenters. Zij meenden dat de AIVD recht 
had op teruggave van de originele documenten. Dat daar misschien 
de vingerafdrukken op zitten van een crimineel doet daar niet aan af. 
‘It is in our view wrong to weigh against the rights of the owner of the documents 
the possibility that the documents may be examined for traces capable of iden-
tifying the person who committed the original crime’, zo overwogen Myjer 
en zijn collega. 
Het betoog van de dissenters zou overtuigender zijn wanneer een 
kunstwerk in beslag was genomen. De eigenaar heeft er dan een 
belang bij het origineel terug te krijgen en niet een kopie. In dit geval 
was echter slechts sprake van ambtelijke documenten, waarbij alleen 
de inhoud van betekenis is. Het argument dat er geen staatsgeheimen 
mogen rondslingeren bij De Telegraaf snijdt geen hout, nu de redac-
tie had aangeboden de documenten in aanwezigheid van een ofﬁcier 
van justitie te vernietigen. Tenslotte is relevant dat het eigendom van 
de AIVD niet wordt beschermd door artikel 1 van het Eerste Protocol 
bij het EVRM. De overheid kan zich tegenover burgers niet beroepen 
op eigen grondrechten. De kernvraag is dus dezelfde als in andere 
zaken van bronbescherming: weegt de persvrijheid het zwaarst of de 
staatsveiligheid?
Hoe nu verder?
Kort na het Voskuil-arrest nam de Nederlandse regering het besluit 
een wet voor te bereiden tot wijziging van het Wetboek van Straf-
vordering, welke wet aangehaald zou worden als Wet bronbescher-
ming in strafzaken. Een voorontwerp is gepubliceerd in Mediaforum 
2008-11/12, p. 466-472. De Raad van State bracht begin 2010 advies uit, 
maar tot een indiening bij de Tweede Kamer is het nooit gekomen. 
Minister Plasterk van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties 
heeft op 7 december 2012, mede namens de minister van Veiligheid en 
Justitie, een brief aan de Tweede Kamer geschreven over de gevolgen 
die de regering verbindt aan de recente veroordeling door het EHRM 
(Kamerstukken II, 2012/13, 30 977, nr. 49). De regering legt zich neer 
bij de uitspraak en zal geen verzoek indienen om intern appel bij de 
Grote Kamer. Daarnaast heeft de regering besloten op twee punten te 
streven naar een wetswijziging.
In de eerste plaats zal een wetsvoorstel worden voorbereid tot wij-
ziging van de Wet op de inlichtingen- en veiligheidsdiensten. Naar 
analogie van de huidige procedure voor het openen van brieven (arti-
kel 23 Wiv), zal de rechtbank te ’s-Gravenhage toestemming moeten 
geven voor de inzet van bijzondere bevoegdheden jegens journalis-
ten waarbij de inzet gericht is op het – direct of indirect – achterha-
len van journalistieke bronnen. Opmerkelijk is dat minister Plasterk 
het begrip ‘journalisten’ beperkter wil uitleggen dan gebeurde in het 
voorontwerp van de Wet bronbescherming in strafzaken. In de brief 
van 7 december 2012 staat: 
Wie behoort bronbescherming te genieten? Een ongelimiteerde mogelijkheid 
voor iedere berichtgever om voor zichzelf een verschoningsrecht te creëren 
achten wij vanuit het oogpunt van de persvrijheid onnodig en mede 
gelet op het belang van de nationale veiligheid en de strafvorderlijke 
waarheidsvinding onwenselijk. De minister van Binnenlandse Zaken en 
Koninkrijksrelaties zal daarom bij de wijziging van de Wiv 2002 deze groep 
beperken tot degenen die beroepsmatig als journalist informatie verzamelen, 
verspreiden of publiceren. 
Hopelijk zal het woord ‘beroepsmatig’ niet letterlijk worden geno-
men. Iemand die in het maatschappelijk verkeer dezelfde functie ver-
vult als een journalist verdient dezelfde bescherming.
In de tweede plaats lijkt er weer schot te komen in de behandeling van 
het wetsvoorstel bronbescherming in strafzaken. Na het arrest Sano-
ma/Nederland uit 2010 is het ontwerp-wetsvoorstel aangevuld met een 
bepaling die voorziet in rechterlijke toetsing van justitieel optreden 
tegen journalisten, zo staat in de brief van 7 december 2012. Met het 
vragen van een nader advies van de Raad van State is echter gewacht 
totdat het Hof uitspraak zou hebben gedaan in de Telegraaf-zaak. De 
minister van Veiligheid en Justitie zal nu ‘op zeer korte termijn’ het 
gewijzigde ontwerp aan de Raad van State voorleggen. Dat werd tijd.
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